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 Nicholas A. Christakis
 Prognostication and Bioethics
 Asocial scientific critique of the field of bioethics can
 occur on at least two levels. The first involves the use of
 social-science theory to destabilize some of the assump
 tions underlying bioethics?for example, by arguing that ethics
 are socially contingent or culturally relative. The second in
 volves the use of empirical social-science methods and findings
 to show how bioethical concerns play out in real situations or
 how ethical decisions are shaped by real behaviors and be
 liefs?a sort of "thick description" of bioethical decision mak
 ing.1 Using conceptual and empirical work on the problem of
 prognostication in medicine, and drawing on a multi-year re
 search project of mine on this topic, I intend to do the latter
 here. My research involved numerous complementary studies
 that included mail surveys, psychological experiments, cohort
 studies, interviews, content analysis of texts, and participant
 observation?all directed at understanding how and why phy
 sicians do and do not prognosticate.2
 Patients expect physicians to prognosticate in a fashion that
 is simultaneously?yet impossibly?honest, accurate, and opti
 mistic.3 Consequently, physicians find themselves in a situation
 fraught with "sociological ambivalence," that is, a situation
 that embodies contradictory demands placed on the occupants
 of a particular social role.4 This social-structural ambivalence
 can in turn result in an intrapersonal, psychological ambiva
 lence. Partly as a result of this ambivalence, physicians find
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 prognostication, particularly about the end of life, to be trou
 bling and stressful, and they employ approaches to cope with
 this stress. One is simply to avoid prognostication altogether;
 but physicians also adopt other compensatory behaviors, atti
 tudes, and even ideological commitments when it comes to
 prognostication.
 The avoidance of prognosis in medicine is quite thoroughgo
 ing. Despite being a fundamental and important aspect of medi
 cal care, prognosis is virtually absent from medical education,
 medical texts, medical research, and patient care.5 The relative
 absence of prognosis in modern medical thought and practice
 certainly cannot be explained by an absence of patient need or
 interest, however. Indeed, when patients are sick, their interest
 in diagnosis and therapy is often secondary to their interest in
 prognosis.6 The avoidance of prognosis by physicians, it turns
 out, is neither accidental nor incidental, for there are powerful
 norms in the medical profession militating against both the
 development and the communication of prognoses. Physicians
 are socialized to avoid prognostication.
 Remarkably, physicians tend to avoid two distinct elements
 of prognostication: foreseeing and foretelling. Foreseeing is a
 physician's inward, cognitive estimate about the future course
 of a patient's illness, and foretelling is the physician's outward
 communication of that estimate to the patient. There are sev
 eral reasons that physicians avoid prognostication, including
 the objective difficulty of prognostication, the uncertainty and
 error inherent in it, the consequential nature of such error for
 the patient's care and the physician's reputation, the depen
 dence of prognosis on social factors that physicians consider to
 be "soft," and the troublesome emotions prognosis can evoke
 for patients and physicians alike. Finally, physicians avoid prog
 nostication because of a complementary relationship between
 therapy and prognosis in both the theoretical and the practical
 consideration given to disease; when therapy is available, as it
 usually is nowadays, prognosis is avoided.7
 Prognostication in medicine raises questions quite beyond
 whether and how prognoses are developed or communicated. It
 also raises questions about certain ethical and moral aspects of
 physicians' practice. Both the avoidance of prognostication and
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 certain related attitudes and practices have important implica
 tions for the theory and reality of a wide variety of bioethical
 decisions. Pertinently, physicians respond to the challenge of
 prognostication in a host of ways that have magical or religious
 overtones not generally expected in biom?dical contexts. Here,
 I will examine some of the implications for bioethical decision
 making of the role prognosis plays in medical care. I will
 consider in particular detail one aspect of physicians' attitudes
 toward prognosis: namely, their belief in the self-fulfilling proph
 ecy. In so doing, I hope to illustrate how social-science research
 on medical care can, and should, inform bioethical decisions
 and bioethical analysis. And I will argue that a clear under
 standing of the role of prognosis in medicine in turn supports
 the notion that prognostication itself is a deeply moral aspect of
 the physician's social role.
 PHYSICIANS' BELIEFS ABOUT THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
 Physicians do not merely find prognosis stressful and worthy of
 neglect; they also find it dreadful. This dread primarily arises
 from two sources, both of which have moral and ethical impli
 cations. First, prognosis is broadly identified with death in
 medical care. When physicians predict mortality, they are strug
 gling with their role in forestalling or hastening death, and they
 unavoidably confront their relationship both to the individual
 patient's death and to death in general. To the extent that
 prognosis is linked with death, prognostication is necessarily
 mysterious and dangerous, and, therefore, dreaded. Second,
 physicians believe that predictions can affect outcomes through
 a kind of "self-fulfilling prophecy."8 The self-fulfilling prophecy
 is a complex phenomenon, and, among other things, analysis of
 physicians' attitudes and behaviors in this area demonstrates a
 difference between positive self-fulfilling prophecy, which re
 fers to favorable predictions that cause corresponding favor
 able outcomes, and negative self-fulfilling prophecy, which re
 fers to unfavorable predictions that cause corresponding unfa
 vorable outcomes.
 Beliefs about the self-fulfilling prophecy are illustrative of a
 broader class of nonrational beliefs that are evoked by and
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 supported by the necessity of prognostication?for prediction
 evokes both magical and religious sentiments in physicians.
 This is not unexpected, since both magic and religion are fun
 damental ways of coping with the strain posed by the limits of
 human ability and of science, especially in the face of death.
 The combination of high uncertainty, high stakes, and high
 emotional interests in medicine in general?and in prognostica
 tion in particular?produces a situation strongly conducive to
 magical and religious ways of thinking.9 Nevertheless, physi
 cians' belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy and their ideas about
 how it works are intriguing?and consequential for bioethical
 decision making?because they are found in a population of
 professionals who are ostensibly immune from such seemingly
 nonrational thinking and who are committed to, and trained
 for, a positivistic, biom?dical perspective on illness and medi
 cine. The transcendent outcomes that preoccupy medical care,
 the malleability, importance, and meaningfulness of these out
 comes, and the interrelationship between technique and affect
 in medicine combine to provide fertile terrain for the emergence
 of such thinking.
 Sociologist Robert K. Merton opens his classic essay on the
 self-fulfilling prophecy by citing a sociological theorem attrib
 uted to W. I. Thomas: "If men define situations as real, they are
 real in their consequences."10 Predictions about a given situa
 tion are not only an integral part of the situation but also, more
 important, affect current behavior and subsequent outcomes. In
 affording an opportunity for self-fulfilling prophecy, social sys
 tems are unique. People can act on their predictions about the
 future in order to make the predictions come to pass. This
 effectiveness of predictions about the future is one of the main
 ways that social systems differ from physical ones?that is,
 they are purposeful rather than either deterministic or stochas
 tic.11 And it is one of the main reasons prognosis in medicine has
 both metaphysical significance and ethical implications: the
 effectiveness of prediction gives physicians greater clinical power
 and greater ethical obligations.
 Prediction is effective on two levels. It may affect present
 behavior as a consequence of its articulation, and it may affect
 future outcomes through the change in behavior. These two
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 effects are in turn enhanced by the conscious knowledge among
 actors that prediction has these consequences. People may in
 fact use predictions as a deliberate means to alter the future. In
 other words, it is the belief that predictions can alter the future
 (as well as beliefs about how predictions alter the future), more
 than the content of the predictions themselves, that is essential
 to the effectiveness of prediction. If people simply had impres
 sions of what the future held (whether accurate or inaccurate)
 but did not believe that these impressions should or could
 influence the present or the future, then prediction would not
 have as much influence as it does. Moreover, people may
 believe in the self-fulfilling prophecy and act accordingly re
 gardless of whether, in fact, the self-fulfilling prophecy "really
 works." While, for example, in medicine there is some evidence
 that predictions actually do contribute to outcomes, the key
 point is that even if they did not, the majority of doctors believe
 that predictions can cause outcomes.12
 Physicians identify three mechanisms by which the self-ful
 filling prophecy works. The first mechanism is to affect pa
 tients9 attitudes, behaviors, and physiology. For example, phy
 sicians believe that predictions can make patients anxious or
 depressed and so affect outcomes, can influence patients' com
 pliance with treatment and so affect outcomes, and can modify
 immunological or cardiovascular parameters and so affect out
 comes. The second mechanism is to affect physicians' attitudes
 and behavior. For example, a prediction of an unfavorable
 outcome can cause a physician to become neglectful, and so
 result in the unfavorable outcome that was predicted. Or, a
 prediction that a critically ill patient will die can result in the
 withdrawal of life support and so cause the predicted outcome.
 The third, and most provocative, mechanism is that physicians
 believe that the self-fulfilling prophecy can work through di
 rect, quasi-magical means: a prediction is made, and even if it
 is not revealed to the patient, it can cause something to happen
 in a word-made-flesh sort of way.13
 That physicians believe that their predictions may be effec
 tive heightens their sense of responsibility for patient outcomes?
 whether a prognosis is made or not. The negative self-fulfilling
 prophecy raises the frightening prospect that physicians might,
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 through the formulation and articulation of a prognosis, how
 ever accurate clinically or probabilistically, harm, or even kill,
 their patients. The belief in the negative self-fulfilling prophecy
 consequently places a powerful constraint on both formulating
 and communicating unfavorable predictions. The positive self
 fulfilling prophecy is only slightly less problematic. The belief in
 the positive self-fulfilling prophecy raises the unsettling pros
 pect that physicians might be expected to cause whatever fa
 vorable outcome they might predict. In other words, patients
 might once again hold physicians responsible for the outcome.
 Favorable predictions?whether volunteered by physicians or
 elicited by patients?considerably increase the onus on physi
 cians.
 The effectiveness of prognosis and the responsibility for out
 comes it engenders cause physicians to believe that it is danger
 ous to make prognoses. The danger of prognosis is compounded,
 however, by the quasi-magical nature of the possible direct
 action of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The prospect that predic
 tions might fulfill themselves in a quasi-magical way makes
 them all the more dangerous in that, if they are effective in a
 non-logico-rational way, then they are that much harder to
 understand and to control. Prognoses might "take on a life of
 their own." Physicians are much less threatened by the prospect
 that a prognosis might lead to changes in a patient's behavior
 that then might lead to a fulfillment of the prediction?a mecha
 nism that makes logical sense?than they are threatened by the
 possibility that the prognosis itself, directly and obscurely,
 might lead to its own fulfillment. Indeed, the three mechanisms
 of effectiveness of the self-fulfilling prophecy identified above
 may be ordered from least to most dangerous as follows: the
 effect that predictions have on patients is less threatening than
 the effect predictions have on physicians, which in turn is less
 threatening than the quasi-magical effect of predictions. This
 order reflects a gradient in which the physician's responsibility
 for the patient's outcome steadily increases. It is one thing for
 physicians' prognoses to affect patients and thus outcomes; it is
 another for the prognoses to affect physicians themselves and
 thus outcomes; and it is quite another still for the prognoses to
 directly affect (and effect) the outcomes themselves.
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 The facts that physicians believe in the self-fulfilling proph
 ecy, that this belief is widespread, and that the self-fulfilling
 prophecy works in multiple ways are deeply consequential.
 Physicians act with the hope and fear that their predictions will
 shape patient outcomes. This set of beliefs affects how physi
 cians interact with patients and how they view their work;
 consequently, it can affect both how abstract bioethical prob
 lems are analyzed and how actual, ethically relevant decisions
 are made.
 Physicians believe that articulating a prognosis may be a
 deliberate way to control patients' behavior. This is indeed one
 of the main ways that the self-fulfilling prophecy is believed to
 work, and physicians often consciously choose to articulate
 prognoses in order, for example, to achieve the perceived ben
 eficial effects of improved patient compliance or better out
 come. The beliefs about the self-fulfilling prophecy and its
 modes of action also affect how and what physicians commu
 nicate to patients. The classical reason offered by physicians
 for not communicating bad news to patients is a desire to
 "protect" the patient. Over the last few decades, this perspec
 tive has come under withering criticism, especially in the bio
 ethics literature, as being paternalistic and self-serving. But the
 prohibition against articulating unfavorable prognoses may
 also result from the conscious or subconscious fear that the
 unfavorable prognosis might have an effect via the self-fulfill
 ing prophecy. Indeed, the aversion to articulating an unfavor
 able prognosis within earshot of the patient can be construed as
 a form of "sympathetic taboo" or "negative magic."14 This
 observation helps explain both the withholding of information
 from patients and the widespread practice of the physician
 giving different information to the patient and to the patient's
 family. Although these communicative behaviors are in part a
 product of the difficulties and unpleasantness physicians en
 counter when sharing bad news with patients, they also reflect
 a desire to avoid contributing to a downward trajectory in the
 patient's illness through a self-fulfilling prophecy. Physicians do
 not wish to be responsible for patients' deaths. The consider
 ation given to the ethics of communication between doctors and
 patients rarely, to my knowledge, acknowledges the fact that
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 02 Aug 2017 16:11:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 204 Nicholas A. Christakis
 physicians may fear that their statements might cause out
 comes.
 The belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy also strongly contrib
 utes to what may be called the "ritualization of optimism" in
 medical prognostication.15 Insofar as physicians believe that
 favorable predictions can cause favorable outcomes, they quite
 naturally try to "shade" their prognoses to the optimistic end of
 the continuum; they favor demonstrably positive ways of think
 ing about and interacting with their patients regarding their
 prognosis and their treatment; and they choose to say nothing,
 if possible, rather than offer an unfavorable prediction. More
 over, they have fewer reservations about articulating a favor
 able prognosis, if appropriate, not only because this enhances
 their feelings of professional effectiveness and relieves the
 patient's anxiety, but also because they believe that such an
 articulation actually serves therapeutic objectives and helps the
 patient.
 Most generally, however, the belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy
 supports the norm that physicians should avoid prognosticating
 altogether. Because the self-fulfilling prophecy makes prognos
 tication "dangerous," physicians often have much to lose by
 making predictions. If physicians did not believe in the self
 fulfilling prophecy, they would be much more willing to make
 and state their predictions. The suppression of prognostic infor
 mation in clinical care, however, impoverishes the interaction
 between patients and doctors and, especially since such infor
 mation is often critical to ethically tinged decisions, compro
 mises the ability of the patient (and the doctor) to make the best
 such decisions. Indeed, as we shall see, the avoidance of prog
 nosis can itself be configured as a moral issue.
 SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ROLE OF PROGNOSIS
 IN BIOETHICAL DECISIONS
 Physicians' beliefs and practices with respect to prognostica
 tion in general and the self-fulfilling prophecy in particular
 have important implications for the ethical analysis of clinical
 decision making and also for the moral standing of doctors.
 Prognostication is in fact a major underpinning for many bio
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 ethical decisions, a fact that is typically unappreciated in the
 theoretical (and often the practical) consideration given to such
 decisions. For example, bioethical reasoning about the with
 drawal of life support often proceeds as follows: The patient is
 going to die. Life support is of no further benefit. Life support
 may be harming the patient. Should we withdraw life support?
 This type of reasoning often neglects such questions as: How do
 we know the patient is going to die? How do we know life
 support is of no further benefit? Who is authorized to make
 these predictions? What if they are wrong? What if factors
 outside the patient's case influence the predictions? What if the
 predictions contribute to the outcome and change the "reality"
 of the situation? Analogously, much of the current debate in the
 ethics of physician-assisted suicide in patients who are irreme
 diably terminally ill has focused on the ethical and legal aspects
 of doctors' engagement in such behavior, and has unfortunately
 generally taken for granted that doctors are willing and able to
 predict when a patient will die.16 Prognostication is, indeed, the
 fundamental and essential basis for a determination of "futil
 ity," a relatively new doctrine whereby physicians are not
 obligated to provide care that they deem futile to critically ill
 patients.17 This doctrine is being increasingly invoked to justify
 the withholding or withdrawal of life support from patients
 who are being harmed by it; in rare cases, it is invoked to
 withdraw life support over family objections. Futility is a fun
 damental assertion about the intractability of the patient's dis
 ease or about the impotence of the doctor's treatment to alter
 the course. Both are prognostic statements. Yet the prognostic
 aspects?in both theory and practice?are rarely explicitly
 acknowledged. Moreover, the key issues of how futility is de
 termined and by whom, as well as its inherently self-fulfilling
 prophecy-like nature, are often neglected.
 Prognostication is a core element not only in bioethical deci
 sions at the end of life, but also in numerous other areas. In
 organ transplantation, for example, a key (though not the only)
 component of allocation decisions is the "greatest benefit crite
 rion," the standard whereby organs are allocated according to
 who stands to gain the most from the transplant and who has
 the least chance of rejecting it immunologically?which are
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 02 Aug 2017 16:11:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 206 Nicholas A. Christakis
 essentially prognostic assessments. To the extent that organ
 allocation takes place depending on the likely success of the
 medical intervention, prognosis is an essential element of the
 ethical decision making. Indeed, organ allocation typifies a
 broader type of prognostically informed ethical concern, namely
 the allocation of scarce resources?whether ICU beds, blood
 products, or physician time.
 Another area where prognosis is important, and is likely to
 be increasingly so, is in the ethical analysis of the use of genetic
 tests. To date, the ethical analysis of genetic testing has gener
 ally focused on the "ownership" of such information, the prob
 lems raised by revelation of such confidential information (e.g.,
 for patients' insurability), or the threats such testing poses to
 our conception of collective risk and community. Yet the prog
 nostic aspects of these tests raise special ethical questions?
 especially given the strong evocation of self-fulfilling prophecy
 that a test of one's genes generates?which might temper phy
 sicians' ardor for communicating genetic information. On an
 other level, however, the use of genetic information for prog
 nostic purposes will likely be more palatable for physicians
 than the current clinical bases for prognosis. The reason is that
 the genetic information will appear to be biologically preor
 dained, scientifically fixed, unsusceptible to individual or social
 influences, and unmodifiable by physicians. Physicians will there
 fore probably feel more comfortable telling a patient with a
 gene associated with lung cancer that he is at increased risk for
 lung cancer?or even that he will develop cancer?than they
 will feel telling a patient who smokes that he will develop lung
 cancer, even if the risks are mathematically identical. More
 over, physicians may feel that genetic prognostication is less
 prone to error. The perception that genetics is a so very funda
 mental cause of events will help physicians to feel less respon
 sible for both the prediction made and the outcome observed.
 Thus, many of the reasons that act to restrain physician prog
 nostication will likely be less prominent when genes underlie
 the prognosis. Nevertheless, the use of genetic information in
 prognosis will heighten concerns about the role of individual
 destiny, concerns that may readily assume existential or reli
 gious overtones.
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 With respect to the basic ethical concept of patient autonomy,
 which is the notion that patients should be respected as persons
 and thus allowed to determine their own care, the accuracy and
 quality of the information given to patients to allow them to do
 so and the feasibility of developing such information are rarely
 examined. Much of the time, patients' decisions specifically
 depend on prognostic assessments, and often the quality of
 prognostic information they are given is poor. Many ethical
 decisions that arise from the obligation to respect patient au
 tonomy, ranging from so-called Advance Directives to informed
 consent, involve a sort of "hypothetical prognosis" in which
 physicians describe various possible scenarios that patients
 might experience in the future. Advance Directives are docu
 ments patients complete in which they express their wishes with
 respect to life support should they become both critically ill and
 unable to speak for themselves.18 Ideally, these discussions are
 initiated by physicians and guided by them.19 But in order to
 elicit the patient's preferences, the physician must first predict
 various possible outcomes. Informed consent is the expressed,
 uncoerced willingness of patients or research subjects to un
 dergo a medical intervention about which they have adequate
 information, predominantly through a disclosure by physicians
 of risks and consequences.20 During the informed consent pro
 cess, the physician characterizes the proposed interventions by
 providing descriptions of possible outcomes of both the inter
 vention and the alternatives, along with possible side effects of
 each. Thus, every time doctors or researchers obtain consent
 from a patient to administer a treatment or to conduct research,
 they are using prognosis. The extent to which the doctor is
 willing and able to make accurate predictions is therefore a
 very important factor in both advance directives and informed
 consent, and it ought to be an important factor both in terms of
 the ethical analysis of such decision making and in terms of the
 behaviors physicians exhibit when engaged in such decisions.
 The analysis of bioethical concerns cannot be separated from
 the specific social context in which both the theory and the
 reality of these dilemmas emerge.21 Numerous factors influence
 whether and how physicians develop and communicate prog
 noses, and these factors would need to be accounted for in both
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 making and analyzing the various types of ethical decisions
 outlined above. What if doctors are systematically over-opti
 mistic in their predictions of benefit from life-support technol
 ogy and therefore overestimate its utility in their discussions
 with patients or in their actions on patients' behalf? What if
 doctors refuse to make predictions? What if accurate prediction
 is not possible? What if doctors' biases or behaviors in progno
 sis make it difficult for both them and their patients to make the
 most ethical decisions? What if predictions affect outcomes and
 so modify the basis for the ethical decision, even as it is being
 made? Surely the role of such questions cannot be ignored when
 considering the right thing to do in clinical decisions that have
 ethical dimensions. The notion that physicians have strong
 preferences and indeed nonrational beliefs (of one sort or an
 other) when it comes to prognosis throws into question the
 extent to which prognostically relevant ethical decisions can be
 made or examined without also considering such "social" fac
 tors.
 THE MORAL DUTY OF PROGNOSTICATION
 Though the role of the physician has become progressively
 more secularized in American society, death itself?which re
 mains a prominent focus of physicians' ministrations?has re
 tained its mystical and religious properties. To the extent that
 prognosis is concerned with death, the act of prognostication
 cannot avoid highlighting the ineradicably nonsecular nature of
 healing. This aspect of prediction in modern medicine is only
 augmented by the dangerous, effective, or even quasi-magical
 properties that physicians believe it has.
 A view of life that casts events as either random or predeter
 mined makes the world uncontrollable, experience meaningless,
 and the events amoral. But in an indeterministic world?one in
 which at least some elements of the future can be purposefully
 realized?the future and statements about it are controllable,
 meaningful, and moral. In its ability to induce emotions and
 change behaviors, in its (at times self-fulfilling) effect on out
 comes, and in its evocation of magic (and religion), prognosis
 resembles prophecy and, as such, casts the physician in the role
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 of prophet. Elsewhere, I have invoked these analogies for three
 reasons.22 First, they shed light on aspects of the neglected
 prognostic role of physicians. Second, they clarify an archetypical
 social relation?one not restricted to medical contexts?be
 tween a "prophet" and a "supplicant." And third, the resem
 blance between prognosis and prophecy highlights the moral
 and ethical dimensions of prognosis.
 As a form of prophecy, prognosis is morally, and not merely
 biologically or even socially, encoded. Because prediction can
 affect both patients' and physicians' behaviors, and because it
 can affect patients' outcomes, it suggests that physicians have
 an important responsibility when they prognosticate. Physi
 cians have an obligation to be aware of the ways prognosis
 informs their ethical decisions and an obligation to prognosti
 cate as accurately and empathetically as possible. That is, there
 is not only a moral duty in prognostication, but also a moral
 duty to prognosticate. Thus, the avoidance of prognosis that is
 prevalent in medical care represents the shirking not only of a
 clinical but also of a moral responsibility by physicians, a
 responsibility that pertains both to individual physicians and to
 the profession as a whole.
 An important source of this responsibility is that prognosis
 often involves transcendent concerns. Death is a focus of ethi
 cal, religious, existential, and moral attention whenever and
 however it occurs. Similarly, the existence and remission of
 suffering are also foci of moral examination. Did the patient do
 anything to bring about the suffering? What sort of life has the
 dying person led? What are the implications of an awareness of
 death? What meaning does the individual see in his or her
 death?23 The salience of these questions is heightened by the
 fact that physicians often can influence the course of illness and
 the manner of death. This raises still further moral questions.
 What is the meaning of this influence, and how might it best be
 exercised? What sorts of actions should the patient or doctor
 engage in to modify the course of the illness? Insofar as prog
 nostication is linked with suffering and death, and insofar as it
 influences these thoughts and actions, it is inextricably con
 nected to the most consequential and meaningful sorts of moral
 concerns.
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 The moral obligation to prognosticate is further supported by
 the existence of an asymmetry in the power and knowledge of
 the patient and physician. The patient is sick, perhaps with a
 terminal illness, and the doctor has technical knowledge and
 therapy that the patient is seeking. The physical and emotional
 vulnerability of such seriously ill patients is extraordinary and,
 coupled with the professional authority of the physician, suf
 fuses the entire clinical encounter with the strongest possible
 obligations. As a result of this asymmetry, and of the trust
 patients put in them, physicians hold power over patients?and,
 literally and metaphorically, over their future. The fact that
 patients are so dependent on their doctors creates prognostic
 obligations no less than it creates diagnostic and therapeutic
 ones. The burden of prediction more justly falls to the one who
 is better able?by virtue of expert training, lack of vulnerabil
 ity, and claims to authority?to bear it.24
 In order to enhance the use of prognosis in clinical practice
 (in the sense of both foreseeing and foretelling) and to meet the
 duty to prognosticate, certain obstacles clearly must be over
 come. Patients do not always want prognostic information, and
 physicians will have to be sensitive to this. Prognostic informa
 tion can be harmful to patients. Physicians are generally need
 lessly inaccurate in the prognoses they develop and communi
 cate.25 Information regarding prognosis in educational venues
 and materials is currently minimal. And physicians resist gen
 erating prognostic information. These practical obstacles to
 prognostication, however, do not subvert the moral obligation
 to prognosticate.
 At the level of the individual physician, there are several
 opportunities for improvement. Physicians should make efforts
 to improve both their foreseeing and their foretelling of the
 future. Inwardly, they should strive to more formally and more
 routinely incorporate prognostic thinking into their manage
 ment, much as they currently incorporate the patient's symp
 toms or test results. In this vein, physicians might keep mental
 track of the accuracy of their prognoses, much as they keep
 track of the accuracy of their diagnostic and therapeutic deci
 sions. If physicians were to begin a process of self-calibration
 in this respect, their accuracy and confidence in prognosis
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 might both increase. Physicians might also make greater efforts
 to avail themselves of prognostic resources that do exist be
 cause information is increasingly becoming available on how to
 formulate and evaluate prognostic information in many clinical
 situations.26 Greater attention to foretelling is also clearly in
 order. Physicians have a very hard time communicating prog
 noses, and they do so poorly. Yet good resources to enhance
 their communication exist, and poor performance need not be
 tolerated.27 In any case, no matter how difficult it may be for
 physicians to foretell the future, physicians can make more of
 an effort to foresee it. To the extent that they are able to
 overcome their aversion to prognosis or their propensity for
 error in prognosis, physicians may enhance the factual basis for
 numerous ethical decisions, and so enhance the specifically
 ethical quality of these decisions.
 However sympathetic we might be to individual physicians
 who avoid prognosis or who make advertent or inadvertent
 errors in prognosis, we need not be so forgiving of the profes
 sion as a whole. As Alvan Feinstein, an authority on ways to
 enhance the science of clinical care, noted in 1983: "The omis
 sion of prediction from the major goals of basic medical science
 has impoverished the intellectual content of clinical work, since
 a modern clinician's main challenge in the care of patients is to
 make predictions."28 The avoidance of prognosis at the profes
 sional level is particularly deplorable since at this level there is
 no interpersonal justification for the absence. Research and
 education regarding prognosis cannot by any means harm pa
 tients, nor can coverage of prognosis in textbooks and journals.
 From a policy or ethical perspective, whatever allowance we
 might accord to individual physicians for their avoidance of
 prognostication, there should be none at the professional level.
 Despite the arguments that prognosis is a moral duty, it is
 also clear from the analysis of physicians' attitudes and behav
 iors with respect to prognosis that these attitudes and behaviors
 are deeply embedded in the practice of medicine. Consequently,
 the practical and ethical concerns that prognosis raises cannot
 be addressed simply by the invocation of ethical principles. It is
 not possible to ignore the phenomenological reality of the
 physician's social and moral predicament in prognosis. The
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 social scientific study of the role of prognosis in medicine illu
 minates the rich complexity of this phenomenon, a complexity
 that is not merely ethical.
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